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This chapter looks at the steps which take place after legislation has been passed: Who does what and by which means to make sure that value decisions made in a legislative act do not only remain 'law on the books'? Which rights exist in that context? How can they be protected? With other words, this chapter deals with sub-legislative setting of rules and making of decisions. It asks which principles and rules exist to ensure the legality and legitimacy of such action.
The questions addressed thereby are as varied as one can imagine: Will a medicine which one study finds to do more harm to a patient than good in combatting the relevant disease be taken off the market in the entire EU? How much minimum capital should a bank maintain in order to be allowed to offer services? May a product labelled as 'organic' contain traces of genetically modified organisms? What level of training should the pilot of a commercial airliner maintain to be allowed to fly over and land on an airport in the EU? Can the bank account held by a citizen of the Union be frozen by order of the United Nations Security Council? Can I ask the administration in my home country to grant me access to the information that has been collected about me in another Member State of the Union? Is the permission to build an offshore windenergy-park legal when no previous study has been made to assess whether the flight patterns of migrating birds might thereby be disturbed? What can be done if the application for the protection for an EU-wide trademark protection for my newest invention has been turned down?
Finding solutions to these questions will regularly require having a basic understanding of what is referred to in this chapter as General Principles of EU law and of EU administrative law.
Administrative law is part of public law enabling and constraining administrative conduct, that is, activity designed to implement EU law. The essence of EU administrative law are therefore rules and principles governing the procedures for exercising administrative functions and the organisation of the institutions and bodies exercising these functions. One word of caution, though, is necessary: The EU's legal order is particularly dynamic. This is due to the evolving nature of European integration and growing interdependencies between various levels of law and politics. The effect is that a combination of legal sources -international, European Union, and national -is being used in most policy areas adapting the needs of the policy area to the possibilities of a Union with limited conferral of powers, and often varying constellations of Member States taking part in specific policies.
In order to explain this area in a step-by-step approach, this chapter will give an overview over which actors there are and what they do (I). Then, it will move on to develop an understanding of the applicable law which is key to developing notions of accountability and the protection of rights in this field (II).
You are already familiar with some elements relevant in this chapter. You have, for example, Generally, where administrative powers are conferred to EU level bodies, they are authorised to adopt acts with general content -so called rule-making. Areas where Union bodies have been conferred also the powers to take single case decisions with binding force on individuals are increasingly frequent. Initially, it was only the Commission which was given external decisionmaking powers in the area of competition law including anti-trust under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, merger control, and the control of state aid given by the Member States (see further chapters 17 and 18). More and more, EU agencies are also taking decisions addressing issues of EU wide concern such as the granting trademarks for the entire EU market, admitting chemical products as safe for use, and other such regulatory activity.
In most policy areas, however, even if legislation has been adopted by the EU and even if some common rules for the implementation of these rules have been adopted on the European Union level, final decisions vis-à-vis individuals implementing EU policies are taken by Member State bodies. Examples for this approach are customs decisions. Despite the fact that customs law and tariffs are entirely governed by EU law, because the customs union and the common commercial (ie external trade) policy are 'exclusive competences' of the EU (see chapter 5), it is national customs officials who take the final decisions and enforce them. This is sometimes referred to as indirect administration of EU law.
B Implementation of EU law by the Member States
In absence of EU law provisions to the contrary, Member States not only have the right to implement EU law through their administrative apparatus, they are actually obliged to do so (see further chapter 6).
Member States, under the principle of 'sincere cooperation' in Article 4(3) TEU, are obliged to 'take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from acts of the institutions of the Union'.
They may do so by applying existing national legislation, but may also be obliged by EU law to pass specific national implementing legislation and to adopt associated administrative regulations in order to create the conditions necessary for implementation on the national level. Member
States, under this model, enjoy only limited institutional or procedural autonomy to implement EU law. 1 The limitations on the Member States' autonomy therefore arise from the fact that, in the fields of Union policy, Member States' substantive and procedural administrative law is to be applied within the framework of EU law. This framework consists of three basic concepts:
First, Member States have the right to set their own standards for substantive and procedural law only in the absence of any explicit requirements in Union law. Therefore, insofar as Union law itself makes provision as regards procedures, criteria, or organizational requirements, national administrations are obliged to act in conformity with these. 2 Secondly, in the area of indirect administration, the legality of Member States rules and procedures will be measured by their compliance with general principles of EU law and the EU's Charter of fundamental rights (see further chapter 9).
Thirdly, the application of national procedural rules in the implementation of Union law, must be exercised in strict compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 3 should be exercised in the European Union by those entrusted with them by the Treaties.
However, delegation is not only a practical necessity but also a general phenomenon in implementation of EU policies.
The Treaty provisions on delegation of powers, set out in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, favour delegation to the Commission (see further chapter 5). 17 In this system, no reference is made to agencies as possible recipients of delegations -despite the express acknowledgement in the provisions on judicial review of acts (Article 263 paras 1 and 5 TFEU) of EU agencies as potential decision-makers (see further chapter 10). 18 
II Criteria for Legality
In the day to day application of EU law, one of the most central questions which needs to be asked and answered concerns the legality of an act or action of an institution body or agency acting within a policy covered by EU law.
In order to answer such question, it is necessary to have a set of criteria in mind which can be used as mental guidance for analysing a case. Not all of the principles listed below will give rise to rights of individuals or will be applicable in every case. But keeping them in mind as a checklist will be extremely helpful for structuring answers to . 31 The European Parliament has now called on the Commission to present a legislative proposal for a general act on administrative procedures to be followed by EU institutions and bodies when implementing EU law. So far, however, there is no standard EU 'administrative procedure act' or similar code or legal framework horizontally applicable throughout the policy areas touched by European Union integration. The same is true at national level, as regards the national implementation of EU law: see chapter 6. 32 General principles of law often include principles requiring standards of procedural justice in administrative procedures, such as the notions of proportionality, rights of defence and others.
(Articles 268 and 340 2 nd and 3 rd paragraphs TFEU). In addition, such principles also have to be observed by the Member States when they implement Union law 33 and where they derogate from it, 34 that is, in all cases which 'fall within the scope of Community law'. 35 In the following, I will first discuss proportionality (A), then various additional sub-elements of the Rule of Law including transparency, legality, the protection of legitimate expectations (B).
The discussion then turns to principles of good administration including the right to a fair hearing, to a reasoned act and further rights of defence (C). This is followed by a discussion of the right to an effective judicial remedy (D) and information rights (E).
A Proportionality
Art under Article 11 of the Charter undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate aim in the general interest'. 44
The directive is also 'appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the objective pursued is achieved' in that it allows any broadcaster 'to be able to make short news reports and thus to inform the general public of events of high interest.' 45 In its analysis of the second leg of the proportionality test, the Court first explores which measures would have been conceivable which are capable of reaching the legitimate legislative goal but are at the same time less restrictive for the rights of the plaintiff. It considers, for example, the possibility of granting the rights holder the right to partially recover the costs of acquisition of the exclusive sports broadcasting rights.
The Court, however, finds that this less restrictive option would not achieve the objective pursued by the directive. It would effectively further restrict the access of the general public to the information. 46 The Court then turns to the third step of the proportionality test regarding the overall disproportionality of the directive. The Court finds that the EU legislature had struck a fair 'balance between' the rights of the parties involved by limiting the broadcasting rights of the short news reports only to specific types of general news programmes and by requiring to cite the source of the information. 47 Thereby, the disadvantages resulting for the rights holder 'are not disproportionate in the light of the aims' which the directive pursues and 'are such as to ensure a fair balance between the various rights and fundamental freedoms at issue in the case.' 48
As noted, the principle of proportionality is applied in many different contexts. Within these different contexts, the degree of judicial review varies. In some cases, the CJEU (as described in
Chapter 5 of this book on Decision-Making and Competence) will apply only marginal review and thereby only check for manifest error of assessment in the different steps of application of the proportionality test. 49 This is especially the case where the institutions enjoy wide legislative discretion. The reason for the judicial self-restraint in these cases is that the Court is reluctant to replace the assessment of the legislature with its own assessment of the politically desirable outcome. Such restraint is therefore a question of respect for the separation of powers as 44 be allowed a wide discretion in an area which, as here, involves the legislature in making social political choices and requires it to carry out complex assessments. Judicial review of the exercise of that discretion must therefore be limited to examining whether it has been vitiated by manifest error of misuse of powers, or whether the institution concerned has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion.' That means that although the Court reviews the different elements of discretion, it only reviews manifest errors in each of the steps. expressed in Article 13(2) TEU. Increasingly, therefore, in the context of review of legislative acts of the Union, the CJEU does not review of the substance of an act but instead checks whether the institutions can prove that they themselves reviewed the proportionality of a measure before adopting it. 50
In areas, other than the review of EU legislation, the CJEU tends to exercise less judicial selfrestraint and will conduct a more full review of the proportionality of an act. Such cases include: A further consequence of the rule of law is the requirement of the correct exercise of discretionary power, where such discretionary powers are conferred on the institution or body. 59 Especially, the institution and body must take into account all relevant factors for decision making but is barred from acting on improper motives leading to misuse of their powers. As in any exercise of public powers, therefore, they must act in good faith and avoid an improper purpose. 60
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPARENCY
Legal and institutional transparency is essential for the exercise of the rule of law and can be regarded as a pre-condition for establishing an accountable legal and political system. 60 Article 263, 2 nd paragraph TFEU, dealing with actions for annulment before the CJEU, makes the application of these principles explicit in providing that actions against all EU institutions in respect of measures having legal effects may be based on the grounds of 'lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers' (see further chapter 10). Airport authorities on the airport of Vienna refused Mr Heinrich the right to board a plane because they found a tennis racquet in his cabin luggage. According to their information, tennis racquets were amongst the items prohibited to carry on planes.
Mr Heinrich, outraged about missing his flight, sought declaratory judgement before the competent Austrian administrative Court about the illegality of the authorities' refusal to let him board his plane.
The Austrian court notes that the authorities were acting on the basis of an EU Regulation (No 622/2003) but, that it is impossible for individuals to comply with that regulation, since the annex to that regulation listing prohibited items on planes has not been published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ). Keeping secret the rules of conduct with which individuals are required to comply constitutes, in view of the Austrian Court, is a severe impairment of the most elementary principles of the rule of law. Such regulations should be declared by the CJEU legally non-existent and hence non-binding.
The CJEU, in a preliminary ruling, adopted a slightly more differentiated position. It held that the annex to Regulation No 622/2003 adapting the list of articles prohibited on board an aircraft, which was not published in the OJ, has no binding force in so far as it seeks to impose obligations on individuals and therefore cannot be enforced against individuals. Article 297 (2) TFEU states clearly that EU law cannot take effect in law unless it has been published in the OJ. In particular, the principle of legal certainly requires that Union rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly. 
LEGAL CERTAINTY AND THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
The principle of legal certainty and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations are both sub-concepts of the rule of law. They are consequently protected under EU law and are criteria for legality of acts adopted on the base of or in the scope of EU law.
(a) Legal certainty
Legal certainty is acknowledged as a general principle of EU law. 64 According to the CJEU the principle requires essentially two things:
 'legal rules be clear and precise, and aims to ensure that situations and legal relationships Mr Crispoltoni is a tobacco farmer from Lerchi, in the region of Umbria in Italy. He belongs to a producers' association which processes leaf tobacco produced by its members and pays to its farmers an advance for the amount of leaf tobacco agreed to be delivered by each farmer. The price is established by the association on the basis of a Council regulation on agriculture markets for that year. During the season of 1988 -after the farmers had planted the tobacco in April, but before the harvest - the maximum quantity of tobacco which profited from the guaranteed minimum price was reduced by the Commission in an implementing regulation. The association therefore requested its farmers including Mr Crispoltoni to repay part of the advance they had received.
Mr. Crispoltoni turns to the local Court against the demand by the association. The local Court in turn requests a preliminary reference from the CJEU expressing doubts as to the validity of the regulations on the ground that they could be contrary to the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations, the non-retroactivity of legal rules and legal certainty.
The CJEU finds that the planting season of the tobacco plants in April involves the greatest expense to the farmers. Since the Commission regulation was published only after the tobacco farmers had made their decisions on how much to plant that year, the regulation for all practical purposes 'had retroactive effect'. The Court finds that 'although in general the principle of legal certainty precludes a Community measure from taking effect from a point in time before its publication, it may exceptionally be otherwise where the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly respected.
That case-law also applies where the retroactivity is not expressly laid down by the measure itself but is the result of its content.'78
The 'legitimate expectations of the operators concerned were not respected, in so far as the measures adopted, although foreseeable, were introduced at a time when they could no longer be taken into account' by the farmers since they were not 'notified in good time of any measures having effects on their investments.'79 ***
(b) Legitimate expectations
The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is a general legal principle of Union law, which has been recognised since the very early case law of the CJEU. 80 The notion of good administration in the legal system of the EU is still evolving. It is perhaps best understood as an 'umbrella' concept containing rights, rules, and principles guiding administrative procedures.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON GOOD ADMINISTRATION
The CJEU has referred to notions of 'good', 89 a) the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken; b) the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy; c) the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.
3. Every person has the right to have the Union make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States. In certain areas, Article 41 CFR merely defines minimum standards which thus need to be understood also in the light of the case law of the Courts on the general principle of good administration.
(a) The right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time -the duty of care
The central feature of the duty of care as such is the obligation of the administration impartially and carefully to establish and review the relevant factual and legal elements of a case, prior to making decisions or taking other steps. 104 In the context of the right to fair and impartial treatment, the duty of care requires a thorough establishment of facts prior to decisions and other measures. The decision must be taken 'carefully and impartially', 105 requiring the absence both of arbitrary action and of unjustified preferential treatment including personal interest.
Most obviously this requires that there be no conflict of interest. At least for this reason, an interested party is entitled, as the General Court has held, to know the identity of persons conducting investigations and making decisions. 106 The notion of fairness in the wider sense is also relevant for the right to the treatment of an issue 'within a reasonable time'. After all, 'slow administration is bad administration' 107 and might be in violation of the concept of legal certainty. This concept is reflected in Article 265 TFEU (Article 232 EC), giving a remedy for undue delays in decision-making.
(b) Hearing and Access to One's File
Article 41(2)(a) and (b) CFR address the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem or audiatur altera pars) 'before any individual measure' which could affect a person 'adversely' is taken. Preparation of a hearing requires and access to one's file. The right to a fair hearing as general principle of EU law must be observed 'in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person'. 112 It is protected to the highest degree by the CJEU having stated that it 'cannot be excluded or restricted by any legislative provision'. 113 As a general principle of law, it thus supplements legislation which do not explicitly provide for its exercise. 114
The right of a fair hearing requires that the party concerned:
 must receive an exact and complete statement of the claims or objections raised.
 must also be given the opportunity to make its views known 'on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used…'. hearing is not excluded simply because the basic act is of general application. It is not clear, however, whether hearing in these cases is a subjective right of individuals or just a factor for review of the act.
(c) Reasoning of Decisions
The obligation to give reasons for decisions which is restated also in Article 41(2)c) CFR, in other words to provide grounds for the action taken, finds expression in the more general obligation under the EU Article 296(2) TFEU to support all legal acts in the EU with reasons. 117
The extent of the obligation to state reasons under Article 296 TFEU comprises an indication of allow for evidence used against them to justify restrictive measures or for them not to be afforded the right to be informed of such evidence within a reasonable period after those measures were taken. the legal basis of the act, the general situation which led to its adoption and the general objectives which it intended to achieve: 118 '[T]he statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Community authority which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thus enable them to defend their rights and to enable the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.' 119 A lack of reasoning of an act is ground for its annulment.
(d) Damages
The right to good administration in Article 41(3) CFR contains an explicit reference to the right to receive compensation for damage under Article 340 TFEU. Article 41 CFR therefore can not limit the obligation to pay damages to violations of the principles listed in the provisions on good administration only. The right to damages is discussed to greater detail in Chapter 10 of this book on judicial review.
(e) Language Rights
The entitlement to 'write' to the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of the treaties and to receive an answer in the same language' simply repeats the existing right under Article 24(4) TFEU. Please note, though, that Article 342 TFEU gives the Council the authority to establish the language regime for the institutions. 120 The right of free choice of the language is 118 Case UN member states were then required to freeze personal funds and economic resources including access to bank accounts and other assets of these listed persons and entities.
The EU, not a member of the UN but acting within its competencies, implemented these decisions of the UN Security Council by various legal acts. Mr Yusuf and Mr Kadi, Swedish citizens, wake up one morning to find that they can no longer withdraw money from their bank accounts. They bring cases against the EU legal acts listing them amongst the persons and entities whose assets should be frozen before the General Court.145 The Kadi case was on appeal decided by the CJEU. Sanctions against Mr Yusuf were withdrawn after several years, apparently, because he was struck from the list due to an error in transcription of his name from Arabic to other languages.
Some of the central legal questions arising in these cases, were, aside from the jurisdiction of EU courts and the degree of review of EU legal acts implementing UN Security Council decisions, whether the rights of defence and the right to an effective judicial review were violated by the EU legal acts. The CJEU in the Kadi I and Kadi II cases, dismissed the notion of Union acts capable of having some form of 'immunity' from judicial review,146. It then went on to address also the issues of rights of defence and the right to an effective judicial review.
Already the General Court in Yusuf had recalled that the right to a fair hearing required an individual to be able to 'learn about the accusations held against them, to be able to understand the evidence gathered against them and to be able to defend themselves against such accusations.' 147 The right to a fair hearing must be observed 'in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person'.148 Although 'the right to be heard cannot be extended to the context of a Community legislative process culminating in the enactment of legislation' applying generally' the right exists even if a legislative act also targets individuals.149 However, according to the GC, this standard under EU law was not applicable to the case. Rather, the impugned EU legal act implementing a UN Security Council decision was only to be reviewed against compliance with standards of ius cogens arising from public international law.
Upon appeal in Kadi I the CJEU set aside the GC's decision and held that ' the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial review of those rights, were patently not respected' when the EU simply implemented the UN Security Council resolution without following a procedure allowing for compliance with fundamental rights. 150 Therefore it annulled the regulation freezing his assets. The Court held, 'that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all European Union acts in the light of fundamental rights, including where such acts are designed to implement Security Council resolutions, and that the General Court's reasoning was consequently vitiated by an error of law.'151 The 'effectiveness of judicial review means that the competent European Union authority is bound to communicate the grounds for the contested listing decision to the person concerned and to provide that person with the opportunity to be heard in that regard.' 152 The Court stated that, as regards a decision that a person's name should be listed for the first time, for reasons connected with the effectiveness of the restrictive measures at issue and with the objective of the regulation concerned, it was necessary that that disclosure and that hearing should occur not prior to the adoption of that decision but when that decision was adopted or as swiftly as possible thereafter.'153 'Since Mr Kadi had not been in a position effectively to make known his point of view in that regard, with the consequence that the rights of defence and the right to effective judicial review had been infringed. '154 The Kadi II case, decided by the CJEU in 2013,155 arose from the UN Securtiy Council's Sanctions Committee's attempts to remedy the situation by transferring a summary narrative of reasons for the listing of Mr Kadi (referred to a Mr Qadi) to him and publishing it on the UN website. Mr Kadi sent his statements to the Commission, requested the production of the evidence in support of the claims and assertions made in the UN's summary of reasons, and asked that he be allowed to submit comments on that evidence. Irrespective of these demands, the Commission adopted a new regulation continuing the freezing the assets of Mr Kadi without further commenting on the statements made by Mr Kadi in response to the allegations of the UN. Again, Mr Kadi brought an action for annulment against this act before the GC alleging inter alia breach of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection. The GC, in view of Kadi I, had found that it was to ensure 'in principle the full review' of the lawfulness of the contested regulation in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU. This meant that 'the Courts of the European Union must review the assessment made by the institution concerned of the facts and circumstances relied on in support of the restrictive measures at issue and determine whether the information and evidence on which that assessment is based is accurate, reliable and consistent.' 156 The GC found that there was a breach of Mr Kadi's rights of defence because 'those rights had been respected only in a purely formal and superficial sense, since the Commission considered itself strictly bound by the findings of the Sanctions Committee and at no time envisaged calling them into question in the light of Mr Kadi's comments or making any real effort to refute the exculpatory evidence adduced by Mr Kadi'; 'Mr Kadi was refused access by the Commission to the evidence against him despite his express request, whilst no balance was struck between his interests and the need to protect the confidentiality of the information in question,' and 'the few pieces of information and the vague allegations in the summary of reasons relating to the listing of Mr Kadi', 'for example, that Mr Kadi was a shareholder in a Bosnian bank in which planning sessions for an attack on a United States facility in Saudi Arabia 'may have' taken place, were clearly insufficient to enable Mr Kadi to mount an effective' defence against allegations. 157 The GC also found 'that the principle of effective judicial protection had been infringed' on the grounds that neither was Mr Kadi afforded proper access to the information and evidence used against him,' nor had he been able to 'defend his rights with regard to that information and evidence in satisfactory conditions.' Further, no evidence of that kind or any indication of the evidence relied on against Mr Kadi had been disclosed to the GC.158
Upon appeal the CJ in its Kadi II judgment confirmed the GC's interpretation of violation of the rights of defence and of an effective judicial review. 159 Rights of defence arise from both the general principles of EU law affirmed inter alia by Articles 42(2) and 47 CFR. However, limitations to the exercise of the rights are possible and conditions are stated in Article 52(1) CFR. This requires that limitations respects the essence of the right in question and are proportionate. It also requires analysis of the specific circumstances of the particular case, including, the nature of the act at issue, the context of its adoption and the legal rules governing the matter in question. 160 One of the obligations which arise in the context of the right to good administration and are also related to the rights of defence is the obligation of the Union administration with the 'duty of care'. In the words of the CJEU, when 'comments are made by the individual concerned on the summary of reasons, the competent European Union authority is under an obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged reasons are well founded, in the light of those comments and any exculpatory evidence provided with those comments.' 161
The duty to state reasons for a decision arising from Article 296 TFEU and the right to an effective judicial review 'entails in all circumstances', 'that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the individual concerned must be subject to restrictive measures.' 162 The reason for this is that effective judicial review requires a verification of the allegations and to review whether 'those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated'. 163 In absence of sufficient reasoning of the act, Courts will base their review 'solely on the material which has been disclosed to them' and if 'that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European Union shall disregard that reason'. 164 The reason is that 'the essence of effective judicial protection must be that it should enable the person concerned to obtain … annulment' of the contested measure. 165 The CJ therefore concludes that it 'follows from the criteria analysed above that, for the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection to be respected first, the competent European Union authority must (i) disclose to the person concerned the summary of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee which is the basis for listing or maintaining the listing of that person's name in Annex I to Regulation No 881/2002, (ii) enable him effectively to make known his observations on that subject and (iii) examine, carefully and impartially, whether the reasons alleged are well founded, in the light of the observations presented by that person and any exculpatory evidence that may be produced by him.' 166 **** In summary, with entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) under the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 6(1) TEU) many of the rights and principles which initially were established under the case law of the CJEU only, are now also restated in positive law. This adds to the prominence of principles which might initially not have been known to the wider public such as the right to good administration in Article 41 CFR. Importantly, however, this has not led to the discard of the 'old' approach of case-law-led developments of rights as general principles. To the contrary, under Article 6(3) TEU, rights are also protected as general principles of EU law. There is no hierarchy between the different sources of Article 6(1) TEU versus Article 6(3) TEU. This contributes to the dynamism of the EU legal system which continues to be capable of adapting to new challenges arising from policy areas increasingly becoming subject to 'Europeanisation' and new influences, such as for example the drive towards more transparency of the legal system which took on board some of the more 'Nordic' legal traditions of the EU. One of the topics which was not addressed in this chapter but which is arising as a big challenge to EU administrative law is the possibility and, arguably, the need for a general administrative procedure act for the EU. This might clarify to a much greater degree than Article 41 CFR was capable, the rights of individuals and obligations of administrations implementing EU law. Especially in the context of a highly integrated system of implementation of EU law in which Member State and EU institutions and bodies are involved, such clarification of applicable procedural provisions would add much to the transparency of the system, the compliance with principles under the rule of law and good administration in general.
